Cross-posted from Open Left
In my earlier diary, Digby, Hegemony and the Policy-Personnel Debate, I wrote that:
Wednesday, Nate Silver weighed in with what purports to be a fairly comprehensive sorting of Obama’s policy initiatives into their ideological positions, showing a huge overall tilt in the progressive direction. I think Nate’s categorization is somewhat questionable, but I do think that the impression he has is one that is widely shared: Obama appears quite progressive to many who have supported him, and that is a major reason why they have felt little or no need to pressure him. Digby is correct in saying that there’s misperception involved, but it’s just not as simple as she indicates.
In contrast, Nate seems to think that his analysis shows that progressive criticisms of Obama are misplaced. I’d argue that they’re not—rather, they’re mis-articulated.
Preview
Nate’s general point that Obama’s agenda is more liberal than centrist is certainly true. This is hardly surprising in light of Obama’s record in the Senate, where he and Clinton had virtually identical records, both as moderate liberals. Given that both are Democrats from solid blue states, there is nothing surprising about this at all. But it’s also true that America itself also tilts to the left—at least on the issues that Obama addresses. While this diary is devoted primarily to looking more closely at Nate’s analysis, the upshot is to try to push us in the direction of a more precise explanation of what netroots critics find troubling. Nate seems to think that his analysis shows that progressive criticisms of Obama are misplaced. I’d argue that they’re not—rather, they’re mis-articulated.
The Show
To begin with, as noted above, Nate’s general point that Obama’s agenda is more liberal than centrist is certainly true, and reflects a continuity with his Senate record, as can be seen in his DW-Nominate scores. DW-Nominate is the roll-call-based scoring of where congressmembers rank. It’s the academic standard for political scientists. It does tend to get a bit funny when folks run for President, and miss a lot of votes, and this happened this time as well, with both Clinton and Obama showing up much more to the left in 2007 (the first session of the 110th Congress) than in 2005-2006 (the 109th), the only other session in which both served together. An analysis based on this record, "Who is More Liberal, Senator Obama or Senator Clinton?", found:
Senator Obama is at most marginally more liberal than Senator Clinton but the difference is negligible. The two are essentially identical ideologically based upon our DW-NOMINATE scores estimated from all roll call votes cast in Congresses 1 - 110 (through the 1st Session of the 110th, 2007)....
The two are by no means the most liberal Democrats in Congress. There are a total of 286 Democrats in the 110th House and Senate (counting replacements). There are 88 members to Obama's left -- 8 Senators and 80 Representatives. The 8 Senators are Feingold (D-WI), Whitehouse (D-RI), Sanders (I-VT), Boxer (D-CA), Kennedy (D-MA), Brown (D-OH), Lautenberg (D-NJ), and Levin (D-MI). Between Obama and Clinton are 8 members -- one Senator, Akaka (D-HI) -- and 7 Represenatives. To Clinton's right there are 188 Democrats -- 40 Senators and 148 Representatives. There is no overlap of the two political parties.
In the 109th Congress, both Senators were significantly closer to the center of the pack. Clinton was 25, out of 46 Democrats, Obama was 21. Between them were Mikulski, Feinstein, and Schumer. More liberal than both were Feingold, Harkin, Leahy, Boxer, Kennedy, Corzine, Lautenberg Sarbanes Reed, Jeffords, Akaka, Inouye, Levin, Durbin, Dayton, Murray, Dodd, Cantwell, Wyden, and Menendez.
Obama’s election to the Senate, as well as his path to the presidency, clearly hinged on his opposition to the Iraq War. It is what set him apart in the Illinois Senate primary, drawing national support because of it, and it is what created space for him to run against Clinton, whose Senate record, as noted above, is very close to Obama’s. Yet, despite the centrality of his early opposition to his subsequent career, Obama played no significant leadership role in opposing the war in the Senate, nor was his position the most progressive among presidential candidates. This notable distancing from the issue that made him as a national figure is the signature ambiguity that troubles progressive critics. "No problem!" says Nate, in effect, "Look at all the progressive policies!" Well, er, yes, let’s look at them. Turns out, progressives are fine with them, but so are a lot of other folks. For the most part, there’s nothing distinctively and exclusively progressive about them. They are progressive in the sense that America as a whole is progressive.
Nate divides the policy space into four categories: "Progressive, Center-Left, Center and Center-right" He then assigns various policies to however many categories seem to apply, in his judgment. The problem, of course, lies both in how one defines those terms, and then how one assigns the various policies. Curiously, for such a nerd, Nate said virtually nothing about these basic mechanics. And, indeed, it’s rather hard to see how many of his classification can be justified—particularly those assigned only to the "progressive" category. Here’s the list:
- Reverse Bush tax cuts for the wealthy.
- Close corporate tax loopholes.
- Mandatate health insurance for kids.
- $1B in anti-poverty jobs programs.
- Raise minimum wage to $9.50/hour.
- Exapnd AmeriCorps and Peace Corps
- Employee Free-Choice Act
- Double $ for basic science research.
- Double $ for after-school programs
- Double foreign aid.
- Community development grants.
- Create Office of Urban Policy.
- Expand use of drug courts.
- $ for low-income heating program.
- Fund adult education.
- Expand paid sick days.
- Fund Urban Promise Neighborhoods.
- $60B in transportaiton infrastructure
- Federal ban on racial profiling.
- Expanded Pre-K funding.
- Re-engage UN on climate change.
- Match savings for low-income families.
As noted above, Nate offers no specific rationale for his classification scheme. But if these positions, collectively, are what defines the specifically progressive component of Obama’s agenda, we can take them to define—at least implicitly—what he means by "progressive." And if that is the case, then it seems that it means nothing that’s particularly ideological in content that would mark these as "progressive" vs. "center-left."
It therefore seems fair enough to resort to a continuum approach—which is, of course, the way that virtually all social scientists view the vast majority of American political opinion. In short, we can look at al the above in terms of degrees of support by people identifying themselves at different points along the political spectrum from left to right. And we can start by examining these proposal in terms of broad spending categories that they represent, since there is relatively little poling data on particular proposals, especially so particular as the exact proposals on Obama’s website.
We can do this in a number of cases by relying on the General Social Survey (GSS) questions on national spending, as answered on its surveys this decade: 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006, and breaking those down as follows: from the seven-point scale we assign (1) extreme liberal and (2) liberal to "progressive", while assigning the mirror image categories of (7) extreme conservative and (6) conservative to "conservative." We assign (3) slightly liberal and (4) moderate to "center left", while assigning the mirror image categories of (5) slightly conservative and (4) moderate to "center right" and assigning (4) moderate alone to "center". This results in a triple counting of moderates, but this follows Nate’s lead, and it certainly does reflect the over-infatuation with supposedly centrist positions.
The national spending questions all follow a standard template, with the specific phrasing that appears below for each question filling in for X in the following passage:
We are faced with many problems in this country, none of
which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name
some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me
whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too
little money, or about the right amount. X.
When we take this approach, we find the following:
Spending On The Poor
- $1B in anti-poverty jobs programs.
- Match savings for low-income families.
- $ for low-income heating program.
This compares to the GSS spending results:
Spending On: Assistance to the poor |
Spending? | Progressives | Center -Left | Center | Center -Right | Conservative |
1: "Too Little" | 78.5 | 70.7 | 69.7 | 67.5 | 52.5 |
2: "About Right" | 16.3 | 22.8 | 23.5 | 25.2 | 29.6 |
3: "Too Much" | 5.3 | 6.5 | 6.7 | 7.4 | 18.2 |
4: Lib Index | 93.7 | 91.6 | 91.2 | 90.2 | 74.2 |
5: #1 + #2 | 94.7 | 93.5 | 93.3 | 92.6 | 82.0 |
Change in #4 | __ | 2.1 | 0.4 | 1.1 | 15.9 |
Change in #5 | __ | 1.2 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 10.6 |
A majority of people in all across the political spectrum think we are spending too little on assistance to the poor. While this is not the same as polling specifically on the individual proposals, it is strongly indicative that support for the programs Nate identified that are listed above is equally widespread, and not just limited to progressives.
This question format gives us three possible answers, but easy comparisons require us to boil them down to just one. Some political scientists have adopted a "liberalism index," which measures the degree of support for the liberal (pro-more-spending) position with those in the middle excluded. Another measure of spending support is simply to combine those thinking we’re spending too little with those thinking that spending is "about right." Both those figures are included in the chart, and are used to measure the degree to which support changes across the political spectrum.
Here, the only significant drop-off comes between center-right and conservative, but after this drop, a majority of conservatives still thinks too little is being spent. There has also been specific polling on low-income heating programs (LIHEAP) in the past that offers further support. According the results overview on a 2006 poll:
ON the more specific question of LIHEAP funding, 42 percent favor "substantial" increased funding for LIHEAP. Three in ten favor "moderate" funding increases and five percent favor the status quo. Overall, support for increased funding rose from 68 percent in 1999 to 72 percent in 2002 and remains at 72 percent today.
Reduced funding is supported by only nine percent, including only six percent who favor no funding whatsoever.
Even without cross-tabs for this question, the levels of support are so high that it clearly must draw support from across the political spectrum.
Spend More On Education
- Double $ for after-school programs
- Fund adult education.
- Expanded Pre-K funding.
This compares to the GSS spending results, reflected in two different question variants:
Spending On: Improving the nation's education system |
Spending? | Progressives | Center -Left | Center | Center -Right | Conservative |
1: "Too Little" | 80.9 | 75.2 | 74.8 | 73.0 | 64.5 |
2: "About Right" | 16.6 | 22.0 | 22.3 | 23.4 | 22.7 |
3: "Too Much" | 2.6 | 2.9 | 2.9 | 3.6 | 12.7 |
4: Lib Index | 96.9 | 96.3 | 96.2 | 95.3 | 83.6 |
5: #1 + #2 | 97.4 | 97.2 | 97.1 | 96.4 | 87.2 |
Change in #4 | __ | 0.6 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 11.7 |
Change in #5 | __ | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.7 | 9.2 |
And:
Spending On: Education |
Spending? | Progressives | Center -Left | Center | Center -Right | Conservative |
1: "Too Little" | 84.9 | 79.4 | 78.8 | 77.7 | 61.6 |
2: "About Right" | 13.6 | 17.4 | 17.7 | 18.4 | 24.7 |
3: "Too Much" | 1.7 | 3.3 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 13.6 |
4: Lib Index | 98.0 | 96.1 | 95.6 | 95.1 | 81.9 |
5: #1 + #2 | 98.4 | 96.8 | 96.5 | 96.1 | 86.4 |
Change in #4 | __ | 1.9 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 13.2 |
Change in #5 | __ | 1.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 9.7 |
There is relatively little difference between these two variants, and the pattern of both is quite similar to that of assistance to the poor—only support is somewhat stronger for education spending. Even after the drop-off between center-right and conservative, a substantial majority still feels we are spending too little. Again, we cannot speak to the specific proposals, but there is nothing about them that seems to go against the general sense of education spending, so it seems most reasonable to assume they, too, enjoy broad support from progressive to conservative. Nate assumes otherwise, but given such figures, the burden of proof is clearly on him.
Spending On Urban Problems
- Community development grants.
- Create Office of Urban Policy.
- Fund Urban Promise Neighborhoods.
This compares to the GSS spending results, again reflected in two different question variants:
Spending On: Solving the problems of the big cities. |
Spending? | Progressives | Center -Left | Center | Center -Right | Conservative |
1: "Too Little" | 61.3 | 49.0 | 49.1 | 46.6 | 37.3 |
2: "About Right" | 32.5 | 39.6 | 38.7 | 40.0 | 41.2 |
3: "Too Much" | 6.4 | 11.3 | 12.2 | 13.4 | 21.5 |
4: Lib Index | 90.5 | 81.2 | 80.1 | 77.7 | 63.4 |
5: #1 + #2 | 93.8 | 88.6 | 87.8 | 86.6 | 78.5 |
Change in #4 | __ | 9.3 | 1.1 | 2.4 | 14.3 |
Change in #5 | __ | 5.2 | 0.8 | 1.2 | 8.2 |
And:
Spending On: Assistance to big cities |
Spending? | Progressives | Center -Left | Center | Center -Right | Conservative |
1: "Too Little" | 33.5 | 22.7 | 21.4 | 20.2 | 16.2 |
2: "About Right" | 41.8 | 46.7 | 47.0 | 47.4 | 34.7 |
3: "Too Much" | 24.7 | 30.5 | 31.6 | 32.4 | 49.1 |
4: Lib Index | 57.6 | 42.6 | 40.3 | 38.5 | 24.8 |
5: #1 + #2 | 75.3 | 69.5 | 68.4 | 67.6 | 50.9 |
Change in #4 | __ | 14.9 | 2.3 | 1.9 | 13.7 |
Change in #5 | __ | 5.8 | 1.1 | 0.7 | 16.8 |
Support levels for the previous categories were stratospheric. Here we see three changes. First, support for spending has slipped from stratospheric to merely strong—a liberal index well over 50% all across the boards for the first question. Second, the question wording makes a very substantial difference in how people respond—they are far more favorable to solving problems than to simply giving assistance. There is every reason to believe that such a difference in wording would have significant impacts on how well Obama’s specific proposals might poll as well. One could probably write a whole book—or at least good fat chapter—about the reasons for this wording difference, but that’s not our focus here. Third, one sees a distinct drop-off from progressive to center-left, but it still leaves a near majority of center-left sentiment that too little is being spent.
This is the sole basis on which one could argue that this is exclusively a "progressive" concern. However, for purposes of comparison, it’s worth considering that for military spending, even "extreme conservatives"—(#7 on the GSS scale) do not give majority support to the view that we are spending "too little" during this decade. Their support levels are...49%. This is indicative of why the liberalism index seems a better overall measure, while looking for support levels of 2/3rds (66%) or more as a rough guide. By this standard, spending to solve the problems of big cities is supported across the entire political spectrum, except for conservatives, while simply spending money to assist them is supported by none. The fact that question wording has such a profound effect—much more than ideological self-identification—is another flashing red light telling us that it this is not an area where a narrow ideological position is the driving force. Finally, it needs to be noted that support for specifically identified programs is almost always higher than for broad categories. People want to know specifically what they are being asked to support. For that reason, all three of Obama’s proposals would probably register even stronger support across the spectrum.
Spending On Science
- Double $ for basic science research.
This compares to the GSS spending results:
Spending On: Supporting scientific research |
Spending? | Progressives | Center -Left | Center | Center -Right | Conservative |
1: "Too Little" | 55.1 | 43.1 | 43.0 | 41.5 | 34.6 |
2: "About Right" | 37.7 | 44.8 | 44.0 | 45.9 | 51.1 |
3: "Too Much" | 7.6 | 12.0 | 13.0 | 12.7 | 14.3 |
4: Lib Index | 87.8 | 78.2 | 76.8 | 76.5 | 70.7 |
5: #1 + #2 | 92.7 | 88.0 | 87.1 | 87.4 | 85.7 |
Change in #4 | __ | 9.7 | 1.4 | 0.3 | 5.8 |
Change in #5 | __ | 4.8 | 0.9 | -0.3 | 1.7 |
Here, the liberalism index is above 2/3rd across the board. Doubling the budget might be a tall order compared to these figures, but it’s questionable if that level would pass muster with progressives and not anyone else—particularly as a policy discussion got into the details of the sorts of breakthroughs such spending could eventually lead to.
Spending on Infrastructure
- $60B in transportation infrastructure [multi-year total for new investment bank]
This compares to the GSS spending results:
Spending On: Highways and bridges |
Spending? | Progressives | Center -Left | Center | Center -Right | Conservative |
1: "Too Little" | 34.3 | 34.9 | 35.2 | 34.5 | 36.7 |
2: "About Right" | 50.8 | 53.4 | 53.2 | 54.1 | 52.7 |
3: "Too Much" | 14.8 | 11.7 | 11.5 | 11.4 | 10.7 |
4: Lib Index | 69.9 | 75.0 | 75.3 | 75.2 | 77.5 |
5: #1 + #2 | 85.1 | 88.3 | 88.5 | 88.6 | 89.4 |
Change in #4 | __ | -5.1 | -0.3 | 0.1 | -2.3 |
Change in #5 | __ | -3.2 | -0.1 | -0.2 | -0.8 |
And:
Spending On: Mass Transportation |
Spending? | Progressives | Center -Left | Center | Center -Right | Conservative |
1: "Too Little" | 50.3 | 37.5 | 35.7 | 36.6 | 34.7 |
2: "About Right" | 42.5 | 54.0 | 55.3 | 53.9 | 51.4 |
3: "Too Much" | 7.3 | 8.6 | 9.1 | 9.5 | 13.8 |
4: Lib Index | 87.4 | 81.3 | 79.7 | 79.5 | 71.6 |
5: #1 + #2 | 92.8 | 91.4 | 90.9 | 90.5 | 86.2 |
Change in #4 | __ | 6.1 | 1.6 | 0.3 | 7.9 |
Change in #5 | __ | 1.4 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 4.4 |
In this case, results are mixed. Support for spending on highways and bridges is actually strongest among conservatives, while spending on mass transit follows the more common pattern. Put them both together, and it looks like fairly even support across the boards.
There’s one more category where broad GSS spending questions apply, and that’s regarding Obama’s proposal to double foreign aid. Here, progressive support is clearly higher, but even more clearly far below the 2/3rds benchmark introduced above. This hardly qualifies as something that progressives support:
Spending On: Foreign aid |
Spending? | Progressives | Center -Left | Center | Center -Right | Conservative |
1: "Too Little" | 17.7 | 9.6 | 9.5 | 9.2 | 5.9 |
2: "About Right" | 31.6 | 27.8 | 26.3 | 26.7 | 26.8 |
3: "Too Much" | 50.5 | 62.6 | 64.2 | 64.1 | 67.2 |
4: Lib Index | 25.9 | 13.3 | 12.9 | 12.5 | 8.1 |
5: #1 + #2 | 49.3 | 37.4 | 35.8 | 35.9 | 32.7 |
Change in #4 | __ | 12.6 | 0.4 | 0.4 | 4.4 |
Change in #5 | __ | 11.9 | 1.5 | 0.0 | 3.1 |
There is more to this story, however. As described in the book, Misreading the Public, Americans vastly over-estimate the amount that America spends on foreign aid. When asked what percentage of our budget should be devoted to foreign aid, a majority wants to "slash" this figure drastically to somewhere around five times the amount currently spent So, either this is a proposal that even progressives don’t support, or it’s something that virtually everyone supports. The one thing it isn’t is something that only progressives support.
This leaves the remaining items in the solely "progressive" column:
- Reverse Bush tax cuts for the wealthy.
- Close corporate tax loopholes.
- Mandatate health insurance for kids.
- Raise minimum wage to $9.50/hour.
- Exapnd AmeriCorps and Peace Corps
- Employee Free-Choice Act
- Expand use of drug courts.
- Federal ban on racial profiling.
- Re-engage UN on climate change.
Given what we’ve already seen, it seems highly unlikely that any of these would actually qualify either.
For example:
- Bush’s tax cuts for everyone barely passed the GOP-controlled Congress, while severely downplaying the amount that went to the wealthy.
- Polling Report’s page on "Work" contains a number of results from questions about raising the minimum wage, routinely showing high levels of support—sometimes 80% or more. The only breakdown shown puts Democratic support at 94%, Independents at 84% and Republicans at 75%.
- On November 6, Think Progress reported on that a swing state poll showed:
- Nearly two-thirds (60%) of voters believe in even in these tough economic times, it is important to pass the Employee Free Choice Act, and nearly one-third (31%) of voters strongly believe it should be a priority for Congress.
- When told about proposed legislation in Congress that would "make it easier for workers to form unions by allowing employees to be represented by a union when a majority of their coworkers sign cards saying they want to join that union," voters favor the Employee Free Choice Act by nearly three to one (55% favor; 28% oppose).
- Last August, California’s leading pollster found broad support for paid sick days:
Three in four (73%) California voters are in favor of a law allowing all workers to earn paid sick days, according to a statewide survey released today. The poll was conducted by the Field Research Corporation for the California Center for Research on Women and Families (CCRWF), a program of the nonprofit Public Health Institute. Support for such a law crosses party lines and includes 85% of Democrats, 75% of non-partisans and 56% of Republicans.
In short, everywhere one looks, evidence shows that the policies Nate has identified as specifically "progressive" are, in fact, broadly supported by the American people. I am not arguing that these aren’t progressive policies. Rather, I’m arguing that they aren’t solely progressive programs, and thus, that supporting them does not by itself make Obama a progressive, rather than a center-left Democrat, which is what his Congressional record shows him to be, according to the DW-NOMINATE scores.
What’s more, this agenda is top-heavy with playing catch-up. For the most part, it’s all about enacting ideas that have been around for a long, long time. It’s not much about new ideas. These are all good things, a vast majority of progressive would agree. But do they really break new ground? Are they adequate for the new challenges we face? Are they really that forward-looking today after so many years on the shelf?
This is not the only argument, to be sure. On foreign policy, intelligence, and military policy there are deeply troubling questions about the direction Obama is headed. The full range of his plans in dealing with our economic crises are far from clear. But surveying the broad outlines of his domestic agenda, the conclusion emerges that a major concern is not about what Obama plans to do, but about what he’s not thinking of. This is what my earlier diary on Michael Pollan served to highlight, and I believe that increasingly, this is where progressive criticism needs to focus: What’s missing?